A tag and an interrogator exchange proprietary information using Modulated BackScatter (MBS) technology. A method for encrypting the RFID user's PIN and thereby making the interception and the Subsequent illegal use of RFID accounts at least as difficult as a present day ATM cards. For example, the encryption method can be based upon the US Digital Encryption Standard (DES), either first or third level. The
Oct. 10, 2000 This invention discloses a method for encrypting both the data in a Tag's memory and the data Stored in an Application Processor, where by transferring only ciphered data between network endpoints, one can thwart all three Security breaches outlined above. This method encrypts the RFID user's PIN and therefore makes the interception and the Subsequent illegal use of RFID data at least as difficult as for present day ATM cards. The encryption method can be based upon the US Digital Encryption Standard (DES), either first or third level. The Tag's personal encryption key is only known by the financial database and the RFID Tag. This method can be applied to any type of financial, debt, The present disclosure outlines three levels of security for which, depending on the RFID application, an Application Processor, at least one Interrogator, and at least one Tag can exchange information: The first level is the "Normal" mode, where a Tag and Interrogator exchange the RFID of the Tag. The second level is to transmit and detect a "secure' RFID between a Tag and Application Processor, using the Inter rogator as a "wireless-to-wiredline" converter. The third level is the transfer of Secure messages between a Tag and Application Processor. This can include downloading new information to a Tag; this is a "Read/Write" Tag where the data Stored in memory is Sensitive, i.e., cash Stored on a debit One class of RFID applications involves using RFID technology to read information from a Tag affixed to a container or pallet. In this application, the container is moved acroSS the reading field of an Interrogator. The reading field is defined as that Volume of Space within which a Successful transaction can take place. While the Tag is in the reading field, the Interrogator and Tag must complete their information eXchange before the Tag moves out of the Interrogation field. Since the Tag is moving through the reading field, the RFID system has only a limited amount of time to Successfully complete the transaction. The present invention enables a Tag and Interrogator to eXchange proprietary information using MBS technology .  FIG. 4 shows the exchange of information over time between a Tag, Interrogator and the Application Processor using digital encryption techniques. The Interrogation of a Tag can be initiated merely by a Tag coming into Radio Frequency (RF) proximity of the Interrogator, depending on the exact Service or specific application. In any case, the Tag senses the Interrogator's signal 401 and broadcasts its RFID 402. The Interrogator, which has no knowledge of the Tag's PIN or encryption key, sends the information along to the Application Processor, as identified by the type of ID number presented by the Tag. The Interrogator also gener ates a random number which it passes to both the Tag and Application Processor. The random number is chosen by the Interrogator 103 and is previously unknown to both the Tag and Application Processor. The Application Processor in turn looks up the appropriate identification information and, using the encryption information associated with the Tag's ID information, generates a response that is functionally based upon the RFID user's PIN (encryption key) and the random number sent by the Interrogator 405. Subsequently the Interrogator has also Sent the Same random number back to the Tag 404 and expects the same functionally based response 406. In this Scenario, further transactions are allowed to continue between the Tag and Application Processor, through the Interrogator, only if the Processor and Tag return the same response to the random query. In this case, the Interrogator notifies the Tag and the Application Processor whether the transaction is accepted or rejected S 409, 410. Note that in this scenario, no information about the Tag's PIN or encryption key has been transmitted anywhere in the network. The encryption key is only known by the Tag and Application Processor, which are distributed when the Tag is issued. Also, all data is encrypted before transmission on any part of the network. The only information that is not protected is the Tag's ID number, which by itself is not useful to an eavesdropper and is treated as public informa tion. Therefore, all three Security issueS outlined above are addressed by this method of user authentication and Subse quent data transmission.
The security provided by the encryption method outlined here is that the response to the Interrogator's random num ber is based on a "one-way function" which produces the appropriate response. A one-way function is characterized by the fact that an eavesdropper that Sees the output of the function cannot reconstruct the input (the secret PIN, in this case) even knowing the particular function. Both the Appli cation Processor and the Tag use the same function, which is determined by the encryption key, to cipher and decipher the information data. FIG. 5a shows a Tag, using a one way function, calculating the response to a random query. In FIG.  5b , the "first round" of a DES encryption process is shown. In a DES level one code, there are 16 coding rounds to encrypt 64 bits of data. The exact function is unique to each user's database entry Since it depends on the particular user's encryption key. For example, with today's technology, a 64-bit PIN can be encrypted using a DES level one function by a 8 bit microprocessor in approximately 1 ms. Thus it is a cost effective way to implement digital encryption and still be able to manufacture Simple and cheap RFID Tags.
It is important to design System Security that will be effective over the entire lifetime of the RFID system. As pointed out above, cellular network designers did not fore See the technical advancements and cost reductions of RF measurement equipment and the proliferation of cheap, powerful and portable computers. Therefore, one issue that must be addressed is what level of security can the MBS System provide against future attacks? Another implemen tation issue that will greatly effect the time response of the RFID system are the network and processing delays of the RF air interface and the connection to the authentication/ transaction database.
Secure Messages
The previous example (FIG. 4) demonstrates how a Tag can exchange Sensitive information with an Application Processor. FIG. 6 shows how the Application Processor can change the information stored on a Read/Write RFID Tag. After the completion of the Tag authentication procedures described above, the Application Processor may find it necessary to change the information Stored on the Tag. (For example, the remaining total on a debit card or the air waybill on an airline cargo container.) In this case the Application Processor will digitally encrypt all the com mand messages and information messages with the "encryp tion key of the particular Tag. After completing all of the data transmission, the Tag will decrypt all of the new data and store it in memory. However, the RF channel is an unreliable medium and will generally create errors in the data transmission Stream. Since only the endpoints of the network have the ability to decipher the information, unnec essary delay would be added if data, corrupted by wireleSS transmission, would need to be retransmitted between the endpoints. Since the Interrogator only has knowledge of the Tag's ID and not the PIN or encryption key, it needs a mechanism to ensure the Tag has received all the informa tion correctly when transmitting over the radio channel. Therefore, the Interrogator should add error detection and/or forward error correction coding to the transmitted data. This will allow any needed retransmissions to be only between the Tag and Interrogator, thereby reducing retrans mission latency. For example, the Interrogator can calculate and add a CRC byte or bytes to the end of each transmitted packet, allowing both error detection and limited error correction. The Tag will in turn calculate the CRC for each received message packet and only ask for retransmission of corrupted packets.
Therefore, it is possible to Send encrypted data between the Application Processor and a Tag without the need to pass encryption keys (PINs) over the wireless air interface. Since all data is encrypted before transmission to the Interrogator over the wired line, this method provides end-to-end Secu rity for the MBS system. This leads to two immediate advantages: First, different applications can use different encryption algorithms, which can depend on the level of Security the application needs or the maximum delay time an application can tolerate during information eXchange. Since only the end points cipher, the data can be a priori encrypted and Stored in memory thereby reducing latency. Second, as computers and microprocessors, the tools used by hostile eavesdroppers, become more powerful, the encryption algorithms can gracefully be updated by each generation release of the MBS System. Since only the Tag and the particular Application Processor entry for the Tag need to be updated, there is no need to modify any other parts of the MBS system.
Using the above techniques as an example, an inexpensive, short-range, bi-directional digitally encrypted radio communications channel is implemented. Implemen tation is made inexpensive by using, e.g., Such Tag compo nents as a Schottky diode, an amplifier to boost the signal Strength, bit and frame Synchronization circuits, an inexpen Sive 8-bit microprocessor, Subcarrier generation circuits, and a battery. Most of these items are already manufactured in quantities of millions for other applications, and thus are not overly expensive.
The present invention outlines three levels of security for which, depending on the RFID application, an Application Processor, at least one Interrogator and at least one Tag can exchange information: The first level is the "Normal" mode, where a Tag and Interrogator exchange the RFID of the Tag.
The second level is to transmit and detect a "secure" RFID between a Tag and Application Processor, using the Inter rogator as a "wireless-to-wiredline" converter. The third level is the transfer of Secure messages between a Tag and Application Processor. This can include downloading new information to a Tag; this is a "Read/Write" Tag where the data Stored in memory is Sensitive, Such as cash Stored on a debit card.
What has been described is merely illustrative of the application of the principles of the present invention. Other arrangements and methods can be implemented by those skilled in the art without departing from the Spirit and Scope of the present invention.
The invention claimed is:
1. A method of radio communication, comprising: transmitting a radio signal from an interrogator to a tag, in the tag, modulating a reflection of the radio signal using, at least in part, a unique identifier, thereby forming a reflected radio signal modulated by the unique identifier; in the interrogator, receiving and demodulating the reflected radio Signal modulated by the unique identifier, thereby recovering the unique identifier; 7 in the interrogator, generating a random challenge, and transmitting the random challenge and the unique iden tifier to an application processor; and in the interrogator, modulating the radio signal using the random challenge, thereby forming a radio signal modulated by the random challenge, and transmitting to the tag the radio Signal modulated by the random challenge. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: in the tag, modulating the reflection of the radio signal using an encrypted Signal, thereby forming a reflected radio signal modulated by the encrypted Signal; in the interrogator, receiving and demodulating the a deciphering the encrypted Signal, thereby generating an information signal; and Storing the information signal. 5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: in the application processor, generating a first encrypted response using at least the random challenge and the unique identifier; transmitting the first encrypted response to the interroga tor, in the tag, generating a Second encrypted response using at least the random challenge, and modulating the reflection of the radio signal using the Second encrypted response, thereby forming a reflected radio signal modulated by the Second encrypted response; in the interrogator, receiving the first encrypted response from the application processor, demodulating the reflected radio Signal modulated by the Second encrypted response to recover the Second encrypted response, and comparing the first and Second encrypted responses, and indicating acceptance or rejection of the result of the comparing Step. in the tag, modulating the reflection of the radio signal using the negative acknowledgment Signal, thereby forming a reflected radio signal modulated by the negative acknowledgement Signal; in the interrogator, demodulating the reflected radio signal modulated by the negative acknowledgement Signal, thereby recovering the negative acknowledgment Sig nal;
deciding, based on the contents of the negative acknowl edgment Signal, whether retransmission should occur; and modulating the radio signal with the message Signal, thereby forming the radio signal modulated by the message Signal; transmitting to the tag the radio signal modulated by the message Signal.
